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 Capital: Pristina
 Population: 1.8 million
 GNI/capita, PPP: US$8,380
Source: The data above are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2014.
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Electoral Process 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.50 5.00 5.00 4.75
Civil Society 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.00 3.75
Independent Media 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75
National Democratic 
Governance 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.50 5.25 5.50 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.50
Local Democratic 
Governance 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.25 5.00 5.00 4.75 4.75 4.75
Judicial Framework 
and Independence 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.50 5.50 5.50
Corruption 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.00 6.00
Democracy Score 5.32 5.36 5.36 5.21 5.14 5.07 5.18 5.18 5.25 5.14
NOTES: The ratings reﬂect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this 
report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, 
with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an 
average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.
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by Krenar Gashi
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Executive Summary
In 2013, Kosovo reached a historic agreement with Serbia, making signiﬁcant progress toward stabilizing relations with its neighbor and taking a substantial step toward membership in the European Union (EU). Kosovo authorities 
organized local elections that were assessed as free and fair despite some violence 
in the north. For the ﬁrst time, the elections were organized throughout Kosovo, 
including the northern municipalities with a Serb majority. Notwithstanding these 
successes, the country is still facing serious challenges to democratic transition. 
Checks and balances of democratically elected institutions are weak and ineﬃcient, 
and the ﬁght against corruption and organized crime lacks genuine political will. 
National Democratic Governance. Under the auspices of the EU, the Kosovo 
government signed a landmark agreement on the normalization of relations with 
Serbia. If implementation succeeds, Kosovo authorities will be able to extend their 
authority in northern Kosovo while providing a higher level of self-government 
for Kosovo Serbs. The Kosovo parliament became more engaged and improved 
cooperation with civil society stakeholders, while the governing coalition’s majority 
in parliament continued to dwindle. Due to the signing of a historic agreement 
aimed at normalizing relations with Serbia, Kosovo’s national democratic governance 
rating improves from 5.75 to 5.50.
Electoral Process. Kosovo held free and fair municipal elections in November 
2013. For the ﬁrst time since independence in 2008, the four northern municipalities 
with a Serb majority also participated. Although the authorities failed to complete 
electoral reforms initiated after the fraudulent 2010 elections, the government 
heavily mobilized state institutions to prevent fraud. Only a few irregularities were 
reported after and during the elections, including intimidation and “family voting.” 
The situation was tenser in the north, however, where Serb groups called for a 
boycott and the ﬁrst round had to be repeated due to violence in three polling 
stations. Due to free and largely peaceful local elections in 2013, Kosovo’s rating for 
electoral process improves from 5.00 to 4.75. 
Civil Society. Kosovo’s civil sector continues to suﬀer from a lack of funding, and 
trade union rights are weak in practice. In an important decision in April, the 
Constitutional Court annulled a problematic law adopted in 2012. The law would 
have allowed authorities to privatize nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
including microﬁnance institutions, and distribute their estimated €100 million 
in capital between private shareholders instead of the nonproﬁt sector. Due to the 
  Kosovo 295
annulment of a law that endangered Kosovo’s civil society ecosystem, Kosovo’s civil 
society rating improves from 4.00 to 3.75.
Independent Media. International observers and domestic media experts 
criticized continued government interference in the public broadcaster Radio 
Television Kosovo (RTK); the EU election observation mission noted the 
broadcaster showed a preference in its presentation of the ruling Democratic Party 
of Kosovo (PDK) during local elections. Due to unsuccessful appointments and the 
removal of its chair, the Independent Media Commission (IMC), which regulates 
broadcast media, remained dysfunctional in 2013. The lack of must-carry laws for 
cable operators resulted in a clash between cable operator IPKO and one of the 
biggest media companies, the Koha Group. Violence against journalists abated, 
however, and a study showed rapidly increasing rates of internet penetration. 
Kosovo’s independent media rating remains unchanged at 5.75.
Local Democratic Governance. Under the Brussels Agreement, municipalities 
in the north will form the Association/Community of Serb municipalities, an 
umbrella organization representing the interests of local governments. The function 
and powers of the organization were still under discussion at year’s end. In the 
November municipal elections, the Serbian community in the north elected its local 
representatives for the ﬁrst time; several senior politicians also competed for local 
seats. In a controversial move, the Kosovo government initiated the establishment 
of two new municipalities on the eve of the elections. Kosovo’s local democratic 
governance remains unchanged at 4.75.
Judicial Framework and Independence. A judicial reform came into eﬀect 
in January, introducing a new court system and an amended criminal code and 
criminal procedure code. Although the Constitution and the legislative framework 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary from the executive and the legislature, 
several cases of political interference were noted during the reporting period. The 
lack of funding, delays in appointments, and confusion over the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court also damaged the integrity of the 
judiciary. Kosovo’s rating for judicial framework independence remains unchanged at 
5.50. 
Corruption. Assisted by the EU rule of law mission (EULEX), Kosovo authorities 
secured the ﬁrst verdict in a high proﬁle corruption case. The former head of 
Kosovo’s Anticorruption Task Force, Nazmi Mustaﬁ, was sentenced to ﬁve years in 
prison for accepting a bribe. Kosovo authorities also adopted a new anticorruption 
strategy and made several changes to the legal framework. Despite these positive 
developments, corruption and organized crime remained a serious problem in 
the country. Pending the implementation of legal and policy-level amendments, 
Kosovo’s corruption rating remains unchanged at 6.00. 
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Outlook for 2014. Kosovo is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in 2014. 
Subject to changes in the balance of power in the parliament as well as the results of 
the local elections, the elections could take place in the fall, as planned, or the parties 
in parliament might call early elections in the summer. The implementation of the 
Brussels Agreement—which includes establishing the Association/Community of 
Serb Municipalities—is likely to spark domestic political debates and verbal clashes 
with Serbia. The government will seek to complete the privatization of the telecom 
industry, a process strongly protested by the opposition. 
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Main Report
National Democratic Governance 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
5.75 5.75 5.75 5.50 5.25 5.50 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.50
In April, the governments of Kosovo and Serbia signed the “First Agreement of 
Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations” or the so-called Brussels 
Agreement.1 Brokered by the European Union (EU), the historic deal called for 
the establishment of an Association/Community of Serbian Municipalities, the 
integration of Serbian structures in the Kosovo Police force, and the incorporation of 
judicial authorities within Kosovo’s legal framework. It also enabled the organization 
of local elections in the north and called on both parties not to block each other’s 
European accession process.2 The deal did not require Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s 
independence but stipulated the withdrawal of Serbia’s presence from ethnic Serb–
dominated northern Kosovo. In exchange, Kosovo agreed to expand the level of 
self-governance for Kosovo Serbs. Once implemented, the agreement is expected to 
open the way for Kosovo’s government to extend its control over the northern part 
of the country, which had de facto been controlled by Serbia. 
In addition to aiming at the normalization of relations between Kosovo and 
Serbia, the agreement paved the way for Kosovo’s EU integration. Immediately after 
the conclusion of the deal, the European Commission recommended the opening of 
negotiations toward a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which is the 
ﬁrst step in the path to full EU membership. The Commission also recommended 
concluding a framework agreement that would enable Kosovo to participate in EU 
programs open to other Western Balkan countries. On October 28, negotiations on 
the SAA started, marking a great success in EU-Kosovo relations.
Despite the landmark Brussels Agreement, northern Kosovo remained volatile 
for most of the reporting period, marked by simmering interethnic tension and 
occasional violent incidents involving ﬁrearms and explosives. Two children were 
injured in the ethnically divided city of Mitrovica in separate blasts in February. 
In July, following an arrest of two Kosovo Serbs wanted for attempted murder, 
two policemen serving in the EU rule of law mission (EULEX) suﬀered injuries in 
clashes with the local population in the municipality of Zvecan.3 The most serious 
incident of the year was the assassination of a EULEX police oﬃcer in September, 
who was on duty in the town of Zvecan.4 
In the same month, Serbia decided to formally dismantle its administrative 
and security structures in the region, paving the way for local elections scheduled 
for 3 November.5 During the year, there were several protests against integration 
and tensions increased within the Serb community living in the north as elections 
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approached.6 On election day, violent groups vandalized ballot boxes in North 
Mitrovica, resulting in a revote in three polling stations.7 
The November local elections, which are generally used as a test of popularity, 
did not result in any major changes for the parliamentary parties. The ruling 
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) remained the largest party, followed by the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), which managed to increase its support.8 
The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) of former prime minister Ramush 
Haradinaj ﬁnished third, while the Vetevendosje (Self-Determination) movement 
remained the fourth political power. 
During the reporting period, the Kosovo parliament fulﬁlled its role and 
managed to arrive at a relatively strong political consensus regarding major political 
developments, such as the dialogue with Serbia. The Brussels Agreement was ratiﬁed 
by two-thirds of the votes of all MPs.9 The only political party consistently opposing 
the deal was Vetevendosje, while other parties had some of their members deviate 
from the party line. The government’s legislative agenda was quite ambitious: the 
parliament adopted 51 laws in 2013, while 29 draft-laws were still being processed 
at year’s end. 10 Frequent and ad-hoc changes in the legislative agenda, however, 
hindered the eﬃciency and transparency of the lawmaking process. 
The separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches does not always function well and the independence of state agencies, such 
as regulatory bodies, reporting to parliament continues to be challenged. The legal 
framework guaranteeing the functioning of these bodies is not uniform, and legal 
bases deﬁning their responsibilities and accountability mechanisms are lacking. In 
addition, the Kosovo Assembly has no sanctioning mechanisms in place in case of 
breach or illegal behavior. The European Union and civil society organizations have 
continuously criticized the politicization of public administration as well as the 
governing boards of independent agencies.11 
The parliament also improved its cooperation with civil society organizations, 
promoting consultations with stakeholders.12 The number of thematic parliamentary 
debates and public hearings grew, and MPs resorted to the interpellation of 
government ministers more often. This resulted in a more engaged parliament, 
where parliamentary committees were more committed to supervising the work 
of the government, ministries, and independent agencies. The government was not 
always suﬃciently cooperative, the number of cases when cabinet ministers failed 
to attend parliamentary interpellations remained high. Intensiﬁed engagement, 
however, also brought its problems. The European Commission’s October progress 
report noted that a proposal by the parliament to debate the verdict in a high-
proﬁle judicial case in March was an unnecessary interference in the functioning of 
the judiciary. 13
Due to deep divisions within the ruling PDK, the governing coalition 
continued to depend on the votes of nonaligned MPs in the parliament. 
Parliamentary support for Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi dwindled in 2012, and 
defections by disgruntled MPs had left the ruling coalition between the PDK, the 
New Kosova Alliance (AKR), the Kosovo Serb Independent Liberal Party (SLS), 
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and the GP 6+ parliamentary group of minority MPs with only 59 members in the 
120-seat parliament. Parliamentary speaker Jakup Krasniqi, who was also PDK’s 
general secretary, fervently criticized Prime Minister Thaçi during 2013 for his 
undemocratic rule and the lack of democracy in Kosovo.14 Krasniqi announced to 
leave PDK in February, taking with him several supporters.
Krasniqi was backed by Fatmir Limaj, former vice chairman of the PDK and 
one of the most popular politicians in Kosovo, who was indicted and was being tried 
for war crimes by the EULEX mission in Kosovo. Limaj was acquitted of all charges 
in September,15 and the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) commander agreed 
with the ex-KLA secretary Krasniqi to form a new party in October.16 On the 
November 3 elections, Krasniqi and Limaj established separate citizen initiatives 
and ran for municipal assemblies and mayoral positions as separate entities from 
the PDK. Neither of them resigned formally from their positions in the PDK or the 
parliament, whilst they publicly supported a division of the party in the election. 
Following a considerable success in the elections, Krasniqi promoted the idea of 
a caretaker government of professionals, pointing out that the governing coalition 
did not have the majority in the parliament and that several of its initiatives had 
fallen victim to parliamentary gridlock.17 Many MPs from the governing coalition 
and the opposition favored early elections scheduled for spring 2014.18 Uncertainty 
over the date of the election could jeopardize the process, as an election reform was 
still underway at year’s end.
In April, the government proceeded with the controversial privatization of the 
national telecommunications company PTK and announced a German-American 
consortium would get 75 percent of the shares of the most proﬁtable company in 
Kosovo.19 The opposition parties, however, pointed out irregularities during the 
privatization process and questioned the capacity of the companies winning the bid 
to run the country’s telecommunication giant. The parties blocked parliamentary 
approval of the bid and initiated a motion to start an inquiry into the matter.20 
Following two months of investigation, the privatization process failed and the 
company remained in the hand of the state.21
Electoral Process
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
4.75 4.75 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.50 5.00 5.00 4.75
Kosovo held municipal elections on 3 November, with runoﬀ votes at the start 
of December. Although the elections were organized under the same 2008 legal 
framework as the deeply ﬂawed elections of 2010, national and international 
observers hailed them as largely free and fair and an important step forward for 
Kosovo’s democracy.22 Owing to the April agreement with Serbia—which aimed 
at normalizing relations between the two countries—the elections encompassed 
the four northern municipalities (Leposavic, North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok and 
Zvecan) that until recently had been administered by Serbia.23 
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Senior Serbian oﬃcials, including Prime Minister Dacic, were involved in the 
campaign and chose to support a uniﬁed political entity for Kosovo Serbs, under 
the banner of the Civil Initiative Srpska. The electoral alliance comprised of several 
Belgrade-based political parties, including the governing Socialist Party of Serbia 
(SPS) and the Progressive Party of Serbia (SNS). Although the Serbian government 
envisaged a sole contender, altogether 18 parties ran for the votes of the Serbian 
constituency, with 8 of them running in northern Kosovo.24 
Kosovo Serbs, however, were not only divided along party lines. The supporters 
of the “No” campaign agreed with an earlier decision of an ad-hoc local Serb assembly 
that participation would equal the recognition of the independent Kosovar state.25 
On election day, groups of people calling for a boycott gathered in front of the 
polling stations in northern Mitrovica and intimidated, threatened, and in some cases 
physically prevented people from casting their ballots. In the afternoon, the violent 
groups entered into three polling stations in the municipality of North Mitrovica, 
using tear gas and destroying ballot boxes.26 The Central Electoral Commission 
(CEC) decided to repeat elections in these three polling stations; the decision was 
supported by both the Kosovar and Serbian governments and the European Union. 
A successful rerun was held on 17 November. Due to the extended presence of 
law enforcement agencies—including the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo EULEX—no incidents were noted during the rerun and only one isolated 
attack occurred in the southern municipality of Parteš during the runoﬀs on 1 
December.27 
Voter mobilization lead to a country-wide turnout of 46 percent, in the four 
northern municipalities with a Serb majority, however, the boycott resulted in a 
much lower turnout, averaging around 25 percent.28 A persistent problem with 
electoral administration was the inaccuracy of voter lists. The lists reportedly 
included the names of deceased people or people who have left the country long 
ago. There were 1,779 million Kosovars entitled to vote in the 2013 elections, 
which represented a 12 percent increase from 2010, whereas according to the most 
recent estimates around 1.81 million people lived in Kosovo.29 
Out-of-state voters could also register and vote, however, of the more than 
41,000 applicants—most of them from Serbia and Montenegro—only about one-
third were approved by the CEC. The number of invalid votes was also worrisome: 
of 811,498 ballots cast, 70,782 were declared invalid.30 The high number of invalid 
ballots allegedly originated from uneducated voters but it also raised suspicions of 
fraud.
Other minor irregularities included violating the secrecy of the vote in cases of 
“family voting,” when family members go to the voting booth together, as well as 
a few instances of intimidation. In addition to political parties and the CEC, state 
institutions were heavily mobilized to guarantee the elections are conducted freely; 
and relevant bylaws were in place in time. The Oﬃce of the State Prosecutor tasked 
50 prosecutors, located in oﬃces and police stations across Kosovo, with reporting 
irregularities on election day. The prosecutors pressed charges against around 40 
people, most of them election commissioners on duty.31 
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The outcome of the elections surprised many as most of the incumbents failed 
to get reelected. Shpend Ahmeti of Vetevendosje scored an unexpected victory in 
the capital, Pristina, ousting incumbent mayor Isa Mustafa of the LDK and putting 
his party in power for the ﬁrst time. The LDK won in two additional municipalities, 
Gjilan and Ferizaj, while the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK)—the party 
of recently acquitted former prime minister Ramush Haradinaj—lost two of its 
important municipalities, Peja and Gjakova. PDK lost Gjilan, Ferizaj, and its 
stronghold, Mitrovica South. In the north, the Citizen Initiative Srpska won almost 
half of all Serbian votes.32 The defeat of the incumbents was largely seen as a result 
of protest votes against the parties in power, not necessarily as an endorsement 
of the policies of opposition parties. Mayoral candidates from the opposition, in 
general, received more votes than their party lists.
Due to disagreements between political parties, eﬀorts to reform electoral 
legislation have stagnated since the fraudulent 2010 elections. Several meetings of 
political party leaders, both formal and informal, took place in 2013, but numerous 
issues, including the composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and 
the drawing of the electoral threshold, remained unresolved at year’s end. 
Civil Society
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
4.00 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.00 3.75
The constitutional and legal framework of Kosovo guarantees freedom of association 
and the independence of civil society in the country. The main law that regulates 
the civil sector is the Law on Freedom of Association in Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). The provisions of the law are in line with democratic 
principles and guarantee an environment free of state pressure and bureaucracy. A 
government Department for Registration and Liaison with NGOs operates within 
the Ministry of Public Administration. The procedure for registration of NGOs is 
fast and easy, whereas registered NGOs automatically become legal personalities 
and can freely operate. NGOs have legal obligations to pay income and rent tax. 
According to the legislative framework, NGOs can register as associations or 
foundations. There were more than 7,000 NGOs registered between 1999 and 
2013, out of which some 10 percent are thought to be active.33 The law does not 
require the automatic deregistration of inactive NGOs.
In 2012, the government adopted the Law on the Central Bank of Kosovo and 
Microﬁnance Institutions, which contained contentious provisions that challenged a 
basic mechanism of Kosovo’s civil society ecosystem. According to the law, the capital 
accumulated by defunct NGOs should no longer be distributed in the NGO sector 
but allowed the Central Bank to turn these organizations into private businesses 
instead, without stipulating what is to become of their assets, including donations. 
The law was especially relevant for NGOs that had been operating as microﬁnance 
institutions, accumulating approximately €100 million in capital up to then. 
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Civil society organizations harshly opposed the law and, following a heated 
public debate, the ombudsman asked the Constitutional Court to annul the 
controversial articles. On 12 April 2013, the Court ruled that the ﬁve articles were 
not compatible with the constitution and annulled them.34 As a result, the assets of 
NGOs can no longer be transferred to for-proﬁt entities. 
Cooperation between civil society and the government has been weak and 
ad-hoc, with advocacy eﬀorts on part of the NGOs often being disregarded.35 In 
July, the government adopted a new strategy on civil society collaboration for the 
period of 2013–2017. The document is a comprehensive action plan, instructing 
government institutions to involve civil society organizations in every step of the 
lawmaking process and help build a sustainable ﬁnancing system. Its implementation 
may run into problems, however, as the strategy lacks a ﬁnancial component. As 
a positive development, NGOs can register to receive updates and participate in 
meetings and public hearings of parliamentary committees. 
The lack of funding remains a signiﬁcant challenge for Kosovo’s civil society. 
Most of the available funding comes from international foundations and the 
development programs of foreign governments. In the past few years, however, the 
overall interest of the donor community has declined in the Western Balkans. In the 
absence of clear incentives, businesses continued to support speciﬁc cultural events 
and charitable activities instead of NGOs, and fundraising from private sources did 
not yield signiﬁcant revenue.36 The government has not developed any instruments 
to engage civil society organizations in the provision of services. 
The legal framework of Kosovo guarantees the freedom to join trade unions 
and unions exist in most of the sectors representing workers and their rights. 
Implementation of the law, however, remains weak, and the Union of Independent 
Trade Unions—an umbrella organization—is regularly called upon to speak out 
against violations of the right to unionize, among other freedoms, and workplace 
discrimination.37 In the past, the government often supported the creation of 
parallel unions to undermine the membership and negotiating position of already 
existing unions. Several cases with workers prevented from forming unions were 
reported in the media, including the infamous case involving the construction 
company Bechtel, which laid oﬀ its employees when they wanted to unionize.38 
Government inﬂuence and politicization have been a problem in Kosovo’s 
higher education system. For over a decade, politicians have been nominated 
for top academic positions at the University of Pristina, enjoying rapid academic 
advancement despite their questionable academic degrees. In March, the 
government decided to open three additional public universities in the towns 
of Mitrovica, Gjakova, and Gjilan.39 It was unclear where the investment or the 
teaching staﬀ would come from. There are numerous private universities, with 
many colleges oﬀering diﬀerent programs both in undergraduate and graduate 
studies. Senior policy-makers continue to serve as professors in both private and 
public universities.
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Independent Media
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75
Freedom of speech and press freedom is guaranteed by Kosovo’s legal framework. 
The existence of several overlapping laws causes considerable confusion, and 
implementation is still lagging behind. The European Union has repeatedly 
criticized Kosovo authorities for having 14 separate laws to regulate the media 
sector.40 
The media market is likewise oversaturated. For a population of 1.8 million, 
the country enjoys a very plural media scene with 8 daily newspapers, 21 TV 
stations—out of which 3 are broadcast countrywide—and 83 radio stations.41 This 
oversaturation, however, signiﬁcantly limits the revenue media outlets can generate 
from the advertising market. In the past few years, several outlets had to close down 
due to the lack of suﬃcient funding. This left the journalists working for them in 
a precarious situation.42 Many journalists work without employment contracts and 
insurance, on the basis of consultant agreements. 
The internet remains free and unregulated, and the last three years witnessed the 
proliferation of internet-based news agencies, magazines, and other publications. 
Internet penetration is also growing fast, according to a study by the Kosovo 
Association of Information and Communication Technology, in 2013, more than 
76 percent of Kosovo’s population had access to the internet.43 This number, which 
placed Kosovo among the best in the Western Balkans, represents an improved 
access to news and information for Kosovo’s young population.
The picture is less positive for the traditional media, where government 
interference continues to be a signiﬁcant problem. The board of the public 
broadcaster Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK) is appointed by the Parliament 
with a simple majority, while the broadcaster is ﬁnanced from the state budget, 
jeopardizing the editorial independence of the channel.44 Although the RTK 
broadcast politically diverse opinions, the EU election observation mission noted 
the broadcaster showed a preference in its presentation of the ruling PDK and 
Prime Minister Hashim Thaci.45 
In 2013, the public broadcaster started a second channel, RTK2, which 
broadcasts in minority languages, mainly in Serbian. RTK2 is available through 
cable operators. Earlier, international press freedom organizations had expressed 
fears the new channel would cause RTK1 to discontinue its minority language 
programming, but the programs continued at year’s end.
The regulatory framework is plagued by political interference and a lack of 
resources. Print media are regulated by the Press Council of Kosovo (PCK), a self-
regulatory body composed of newspaper editors, while broadcast media are regulated 
by the Independent Media Council (IMC), an independent body that reports to 
the parliament. The independence of IMC, however, had been put to question 
several times in the past due to the politicization of appointments.46 Nominations 
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to the council are handled by an ad-hoc parliamentary committee, which selects 
two candidates for each open position and refers them to the parliament. 
The IMC had been short of its intended seven-member total for most of 2011 
and 2012 and remained dysfunctional in 2013. In April, due to deep disagreements 
between the governing parties and the opposition, the parliament voted against two 
nominees selected by the committee twice, and the positions remained vacant at 
year’s end.47 At the same time, two members of the IMC were dismissed due to a 
conﬂict of interest in December;48 along with the chairman, who had held political 
positions before and whose 2012 appointment violated the requirements.
The dysfunctional IMC was unable to make signiﬁcant progress in the digital 
switchover. A draft strategy was submitted to the parliament in December 2012 
and two public discussions took place during the summer of 2013. The strategy, 
however, was not yet adopted at year’s end, which risks meeting the deadline of 
2015 adopted by all European countries.
The IMC had failed to provide must-carry requirements for cable operators, a 
signiﬁcant problem that was exposed in 2013 during a dispute between the cable 
operator IPKO and one of the largest media companies, Koha Group. Following 
unsuccessful negotiations of a broadcasting fee, IPKO reassigned Koha Group’s 
TV station, Kohavision, from channel number 3 to channel 83 in April, grouping 
it together with local broadcasters. Earlier, Koha Ditore—the daily newspaper 
published by Koha Group—published critical reports on IPKO’s transformation 
from a nonproﬁt organization to a commercial company, as well as its purchase by 
a Slovenian company, Telekom Slovenije. The reports also contained allegations on 
political ties between previous and current IPKO leadership and Kosovar Prime 
Minister Thaci.49 IPKO claimed Koha Group is using its outlets to pressure them 
into securing a disadvantageous deal with Kohavision.50 
Kosovo’s Law on Access to Public Documents is limited in scope, and its 
implementation is unsatisfactory on both national and local level. State institutions 
often fail to reply to journalists within the timeframe provided by the law, and 
government authorities frequently deny access to representatives of the media and 
civil society.51 
Journalists are free to associate; there are two major associations on the national 
level—the Association of Professional Journalists of Kosovo (AGPK) and the Union 
of Journalists of Kosovo (UGK)—and several other local and regional organizations. 
The AGPK, which played a major role in representing journalists’ interests in 2012, 
was plagued by internal problems during the reporting period. Due to allegations 
of close ties between the newly elected president of the organization and business 
and political leaders,52 several board members left the AGPK, and the independent 
media decided not to report on its activities.53 Violence against journalists abated in 
2013; however, perpetrators are rarely prosecuted.
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Local Democratic Governance 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.25 5.00 5.00 4.75 4.75 4.75
The successful administration of local elections in November was a major step 
forward for local governance in Kosovo. Elections were held, for the ﬁrst time, 
in the northern municipalities with a Serbian majority, where parallel structures 
administered by the Serbian government had been in place since 1999. The 
institutions—which are expected to be established in the beginning of 2014—will 
serve as the ﬁrst legally elected local representation of the north and will seek to 
institutionalize cooperation with Pristina authorities. 
The Brussels Agreement signed between Kosovo and Serbia on 19 April provides 
for the establishment of an Association/Community of Serb municipalities, which 
will serve as a coordinating body between the central and local level of government. 
Based on the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, the 
member municipalities will be able to transfer powers to this umbrella organization 
and use it as a platform for cooperation in the areas of economic development, 
education, health, urban and rural planning. The Association/Community could 
further be strengthened by additional competences and will participate in key 
Kosovo institutions safeguarding national minorities. The agreement also set out 
the incorporation of Serbian police oﬃcers in the Kosovo police, with their own 
regional police commander as well as a regional special unit.
Ambiguities in the text of the agreement and diﬀerences in interpretation 
between Kosovar and Serbian authorities, however, could lead to problems in 
implementation. Disagreement between the parties over the name of the institution 
already signaled a diﬃcult start to the negotiations. The Serbian delegation insisted 
on the word “community” (in Serbian “zajednica,” which can also be translated as 
“union”), which corresponds to the name of previously existing Serb institutions and 
conveys a potential impression of independence from Kosovo’s constitutional order. 
The Kosovo delegation, on the other hand, preferred to name it “association,” like 
the existing Association of Kosovo Municipalities, raising fears that the agreement 
would create a separate entity in the multiethnic state, with the new institution 
acquiring executive powers. Eventually, the joint name of Association/Community 
represented a compromise, and the actual role of the institution was still shaping 
up at year’s end.
Kosovo authorities have completed a substantial transfer of power from the 
central government to municipalities based on a decentralization plan required by 
the international community upon Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. 
To this date, however, the municipalities continue to be highly dependent on the 
central government. According to a recent analysis by the Ministry for Local Self-
Government in Kosovo, an average of 82 percent of their budget originated from 
the central government.54 The collection of property tax remained the main source 
of revenue for municipal governments. 
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The decentralization process and the transfer of power to municipalities had 
made local governments more attractive for senior politicians. Numerous high-level 
politicians, including cabinet ministers, ran for municipal and mayoral positions in 
the November local elections. Notably, the vice chairman of Vetevendosje, Shpend 
Ahmeti, was elected mayor of Pristina, while PDK cabinet members Blerand 
Stavileci and Petrit Selimi were running for the municipal assembly of the capital. 
A senior oﬃcial of the LDK, former deputy prime minister Lutﬁ Haziri, was elected 
mayor of Gjilan. Mimoza Kusari Lila, deputy prime minister and minister of 
trade and industry, resigned from her positions to get elected as mayor of Gjakova 
municipality.
After the government had set up Serb-majority municipalities as part of 
the independence plan in 2008 to empower the Serb community in Kosovo, 
numerous Albanian settlements wished to create their own local government 
structures. Between 2009 and 2011, 11 groups of villages submitted requests to 
the Ministry of Local Government Administration to become municipalities.55 
Since all municipalities and especially the small ones receive government grants, the 
status of municipality is appealing to smaller settlements because of ﬁnancial gains. 
However, poor project management and overstaﬃng on the local level have been 
hindering the eﬃciency of municipal governments.56
In two separate decisions in May and July 2013, the Kosovo government 
decided to establish two new municipalities: Has, in southern Kosovo, and Zhegra, 
in the southeast.57 The opposition strongly protested the decision and claimed 
the governing parties were seeking to maximize their gains on the eve of local 
elections. A detailed independent analysis by GAP institute, a local think tank, 
showed that the creation of new municipalities would reduce the overall budget 
for all municipalities in Kosovo, increase public expenditure and the number of 
civil servants, and would leave the new municipalities completely dependent on 
the central government due to a lack of resources.58 Because of local elections in 
November, the new municipalities were not yet established at year’s end. 
Judicial Framework and Independence
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.50 5.50 5.50
Although Kosovo’s constitution and laws oﬀer a solid framework for protecting 
fundamental freedoms and rights, their implementation is lagging behind in 
practice. Enduring problems include challenges to equality before the law and 
political interference in the work of the judiciary both by the executive and 
legislative branches. 
A judicial reform came into eﬀect in January, introducing a new court 
system and an amended criminal code and criminal procedure code.59 In the new 
system, municipal courts are replaced by basic courts and regional district courts 
by specialized courts of appeals, while the Supreme Court of Kosovo remains the 
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highest judicial authority.60 To ensure a smooth transition process, the Judicial 
Council appointed representatives of the new court structures, including court 
presidents, on time. In a formal opinion, the Supreme Court clariﬁed potential 
ambiguities in connection with the transition. 
The court system remains underfunded. In 2013, the judiciary received less 
than 1.5 percent of the Kosovo budget of €1.5 billion, which accounted for 0.5 
percent of the country’s GDP.61 As a consequence, Kosovo has fewer judges and 
prosecutors per capita than most EU countries or neighboring Serbia, Montenegro, 
and Croatia. The backlog of cases continues to pose a signiﬁcant problem. Even 
though the government had successfully implemented a strategy that lowered the 
number of pending cases in the past few years, the reporting period saw an increase 
of about 10 percent, with a total of 235,000 cases at the end of 2013. The increase 
in workload was partly due to the reorganization of the court system. The number 
of court decisions that are yet to be executed was also very high, rising past the 
100,000 ﬁgure.62 
Due to partisan wrangling, some key positions were left unﬁlled during 2013. 
The Constitutional Court of Kosovo was still one judge short at year’s end, which 
jeopardized the court’s daily work. The major political parties, PDK and LDK, 
insisted that their loyalists take the position, while independent and professional 
candidates received little support in the parliament. Two members of the Kosovo 
Judicial Council (KJC)—an independent body responsible for overseeing the 
judiciary—were still to be appointed in December. The European Commission 
repeatedly instructed the government to ensure the majority of the judges are 
elected by their peers. In addition, the Commission criticized the authorities for 
ﬁlling only 334 out of 404 judicial and 125 out of 146 prosecutorial positions.63 
Oversight of the judiciary is ineﬃcient. In 2013, none of the few disciplinary 
sanctions against judges and prosecutors resulted in dismissal. 
Separation of powers is weak in practice, during the reporting period, 
government oﬃcials or members of parliament interfered with the work of the 
public prosecutor and the courts on several occasions. In March, a group of MPs 
demanded the establishment of a parliamentary commission to investigate the 
high-proﬁle Kiqina case—in which former Kosovo guerillas were convicted of a 
revenge killing—calling the 2002 verdict “unfair.” The parliament rejected the 
probe after EU and U.S. representatives warned against overturning a decision 
of the judiciary.64 The European Commission also criticized the government for 
statements they made during the indictment of key PDK oﬃcials, who were 
accused of war crimes in the cases of Kleçka and Drenica Group.65 
Equality before the law and the right to a fair trial remains a persistent 
challenge, mainly due to judges’ and prosecutors’ lack of experience and disregard 
for separation of powers. Minor crimes and cases against people with no political 
ties are prosecuted quickly with often maximum penalties, while cases against 
inﬂuential criminals frequently drag on for years.66 As an example, young people 
caught possessing small quantities of cannabis reportedly spend months in pretrial 
detention, while their dealers are often released.67 
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The European Commission also urged Kosovo authorities to establish a 
sound legal framework for the interception of telecommunications, distinguishing 
between judicial interception and interception for intelligence purposes in order to 
avoid political inﬂuencing of criminal cases. Independent civil society reports noted 
that Kosovo judges and prosecutors breach their code of ethics by talking about 
ongoing investigations and trials.68
Confusion over the jurisdiction of the Constitutional and the Supreme Court 
also undermined the integrity of the judiciary. In January, the Constitutional 
Court annulled a Supreme Court decision in the case of the former mayor of 
Ferizaj, Bajrush Xhemajli. The court stated the constitutional rights of the PDK 
politician—who had been sentenced for dangerous driving—were violated during 
the trial.69 The progress report published by the European Commission in October 
criticized the Constitutional Court’s decision to step in “as an (additional) court of 
last instance.”70 
During the reporting period, Kosovo made some progress in strengthening 
international cooperation by concluding two bilateral agreements on mutual 
legal assistance with Albania and Italy. Cooperation with countries that do not 
recognize Kosovo as well as with international organizations of which Kosovo is 
not a member, such as Interpol, is administered via the international mission of the 
United Nations (UNMIK) or the EU (EULEX) present on Kosovo territory. 
Corruption
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.00 6.00
Generally, the political will to curb corruption and organized crime had been weak 
in Kosovo, and it remained largely a subject of political rhetoric during the reporting 
period. High perceived corruption in the state administration as well as on the level 
of senior politicians hinders the country’s development and makes it diﬃcult to 
attract foreign direct investment.71 Witness intimidation continued to be a serious 
problem, and the implementation of the legal framework was limited. Despite the 
fact that the public sector generates about one-third of the country’s GDP—with 
many businesses and even entire sectors being heavily dependent on doing business 
with the government—and a widespread public perception of corruption as one of 
the biggest problems in Kosovo, the number of cases that are brought before justice 
remains small.72 
New criminal and procedural codes came into force in January 2013, 
strengthening the legislative framework against corruption. Pertinent changes 
include amendments to the deﬁnition of conﬂict of interest, non-declaration of 
assets, and failure to report criminal oﬀenses. In March, a new Law on Extended 
Powers for Conﬁscation of Assets Acquired by Criminal Oﬀense entered into force, 
ﬁlling an important gap in the ﬁght against corruption and organized crime as 
legislation enabling authorities to conﬁscate ill-gotten assets had been absent. The 
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EU progress report on Kosovo, however, noted that law enforcement agencies are 
very reluctant to initiate ﬁnancial investigations.73
The parliament adopted a new Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 
in February, covering the period between 2013 and 2017. The speaker of the 
parliament, Jakup Krasniqi, criticized the strategy, saying it was merely a piece of 
paper serving to boost EU integration indicators and increase the government’s 
presence in the media.74 The strategy included a corruption risk assessment and set 
out an investigation of priority sectors but was not matched by proper budgetary 
allocations. The ﬁrst high-proﬁle verdict for corruption and misconduct was 
delivered in May 2013. In a case that started in 2012, a basic court sentenced the 
former head of the Anticorruption Task Force—an organization founded in 2011 
to work on high-proﬁle cases—to ﬁve years imprisonment. Nazmi Mustaﬁ was 
sentenced for accepting a bribe to drop charges in an ongoing investigation.75 At 
the same time, authorities failed to empower the Anti-corruption Task Force, which 
lacked two out of ﬁve prosecutors at year’s end, making its day-to-day operation 
diﬃcult. 
The multiplication of institutions dealing with corruption in the past few years 
did not bring on more eﬃciency. In February 2012, President Jahjaga established 
the National Anticorruption Council to coordinate inter-institutional eﬀorts 
in the ﬁght against corruption. Although the move was widely welcomed by the 
international community, the council’s role remained largely ceremonial in 2012, 
and the institution was completely inactive in 2013. The anticorruption department 
of the police, in cooperation with the EULEX mission, launched six investigations, 
mainly covering oﬀenses of bribery and fraud.76 The Anticorruption Agency 
improved its cooperation with the prosecution, which now provides systematic 
feedback to cases reported by the agency. 
Political party ﬁnancing in Kosovo is opaque, owing to the weaknesses in 
the law. A 2012 investigation by the Zeri daily revealed that companies that were 
sponsoring political parties during their election campaign were the most likely 
to win government tenders.77 Parliament adopted an amendment to the Law on 
Financing Political Parties, which was requested by the EU, in a rush in August 
2013. Opposition parties, especially the LDK, criticized the law, saying the changes 
were not substantial and left room for numerous interpretations.78 Inconsistencies 
in declaration and false declaration of assets by politicians remains a problem. 
 Author: Krenar Gashi
Krenar Gashi is the Executive Director of the Institute for Development Policy 
(INDEP) in Pristina. 
1 European Union External Action Service, “Serbia and Kosovo Reach Landmark Deal,” press 
release, 19 April 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eu-facilitated_
dialogue_en.htm.
2 “Text of historic agreement between Kosovo and Serbia,” European Voice, 19 April 2013, 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/page/3609.aspx?&blogitemid=1723. 
3 “EU Police Injured in Clash with Kosovo Serbs,” Balkan Insight, 30 July 2013,http://www.
balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-serbs-block-roads-after-fellow-serbs-arrest. 
4 European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX Kosovo), “Up to EUR 27,000 reward for 
information about murder of EULEX staﬀ member,” press release, 27 September 2013, 
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/pressreleases/0494.php. 
5 Gordana Andric, “Serbia Pulls Plug on Northern Kosovo Assemblies,” Balkan Insight, 11 Sep-
tember 2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/belgrade-dismantles-north-kosovo-
assemblies. 
6 “Kosovo Serbs Denounce Integration and Traitors,” Balkan Insight, 31 January 2013, http://
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-serbs-rally-against-their-integration-into-kosovo. 
7 Kosovo Elections Marred by Violence, Euractiv, 4 November 2013, http://www.euractiv.
com/enlargement/kosovo-elections-marred-violence-news-531485. 
8 Central Election Commission, Certiﬁed Election Results, 2013.
9 Donjetë Hoxha and Xhejlane Haliti, “Kuvendi Ratiﬁkon Marreveshjen” [The Assembly 
Ratiﬁes the Agreement], Gazeta JNK, 27 June 2013, http://gazetajnk.com/?cid=1,1018,5900. 
10 The Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, Evidenca e Ligjeve [The list of laws], Pristina: 
Assembly, 15 November 2013, http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/
Evidenca%20e%20ligjeve.pdf.
11 Summary from Institute for Development Policy and Parliamentary Committee for 
Economic Development, Infrastructure, Trade and Industry, “Reporting to the Kosovo 
Assembly,” January 2014.
12 Author’s interviews with representatives of two Kosovo think tanks working with the 
Assembly, Pristina, October 2013. 
13 European Commission, Kosovo 2013 Progress Report (Brussels: European Commission, 16 
October 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/ks_
rapport_2013.pdf. 
14 Krasniqi me parti te re ndane deputetet e PDK-se [Krasniqi with a new political party—
divides PDK’s MPs], Zeri, 23 September 2013, http://www.zeri.info/artikulli/15685/
krasniqi-me-parti-te-re-ndane-deputetet-e-pdk-se. 
15 “Kosovo Commander Limaj Acquitted of War Crimes,” Balkan Insight, 18 September 2013, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-fatmir-limaj-klecka-verdict. 
16 Elton Tota, “Krasniqi and Limaj Form New Party,” Independent Balkan News Agency, 10 
February 2013, http://www.balkaneu.com/krasniqi-limaj-form-party/. 
17 Anita Kadriu, “Krasniqi pro qeverise teknike” [Krasniqi favours a technical government], 
Zeri, 17 November 2013, http://zeri.info/artikulli/20758/krasniqi-pro-qeverise-teknike.
18 Author’s interviews with MPs of the Kosovo Assembly, Pristina, September-November 2013. 
19 “Kosovo Agrees PTK Sale,” TeleGeography, 17 April 2013, http://www.telegeography.com/
products/commsupdate/articles/2013/04/17/kosovo-agrees-ptk-sale/. 
20 “Opozita kerkon komision hetimor per privatizimin e PTK-se” [The opposition requests a 
parliamentary investigation on the PTK privatization], Kosova Press, 23 September 2013, 
http://www.kosovapress.com/sq/mobile/ekonomi/opozita-kerkon-komision-hetimor-per-
privatizimin-e-ptk-se-3021/.
21 Elton Tota, “Sale of the shares of Kosovo’s Telecom Fails Again,” Balkan EU, 31 December 
2013, http://www.balkaneu.com/sale-shares-kosovos-post-telecom-fails/. 
  Kosovo 311
22 European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM), Kosovo Municipal Elections 
3 November 2013, Preliminary Statement: A Positive Step Forward for Democracy in Kosovo 
(Pristina: EU EOM, 5 November 2013), http://www.eueom.eu/ﬁles/pressreleases/english/
preliminary-statement-in-kosovo-05112013_en.pdf; Democracy in Action website: Events, 
http://www.demokracianeveprim.org/al/.
23 The Republic of Serbia had maintained its administrative presence in northern Kosovo. 
Municipal assemblies and mayors had been elected in elections organized by Serbia and as 
such had not been recognized by the Kosovo government or the international community. 
24 Besim Abazi, “18 Subjekte serbe per zgjedhjet ne Kosove” [18 Serb political entities for 
Kosovo elections], Voice of America, 5 September 2013, http://www.zeriamerikes.com/
content/kosovo-elections/1743615.html. 
25 “Kosovo Election Unacceptable for Serbs in the North,” Tanjug / B92, 16 August 2013, 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=08&dd=16&nav_id=87349. 
26 Aleksandar Vasovic, “Kosovo vote, key to Serb integration, marred by violence, boycott,” 
Reuters, 3 November 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/03/us-kosovo-election-
idUSBRE9A204620131103. 
27 Zgjedhjet ne veri te Kosoves, pa incidente [Elections without incidents in North Mitrovica], 
Koha Ditore, 18 November 2013, p.1; and UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 30 January 
2014, http://www.unmikonline.org/SGReports/S-2014-68.pdf.
28 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, (Pristina: UNMIK, 30 January 2014), http://www.
unmikonline.org/SGReports/S-2014-68.pdf. 
29 Jeta Xharra, “As a voter, my late grandpa just won’t die,” Balkan Insight, 30 October 2013, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/as-a-voter-my-late-grandpa-just-won-t-die; 
Kosovo Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/kv.html; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Elections in 
Kosovo: November 3 local elections, frequently asked questions”, IFES, 1 November 2013, 
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2013/2013%
20Kosovo%20Municipal%20Elections%20FAQs.pdf. 
30 Central Election Commission, 2013 Elections Statistics, http://www.kqz-ks.org/Uploads/
Documents/1%20-%20MAssembly%20-%20General%20Statistics_irtsmvxufd.pdf. 
31 The State Prosecutor’s Oﬃce has continuously informed the public on the prosecutions 
regarding electoral fraud in numerous press releases and media appearances. 
32 Central Election Commission, Certiﬁed Results for Municipal Elections 2013, Pristina. 
33 Institute for Development Policy (INDEP), The State of Civil Society Organisations in Kosovo, 
unpublished report, 2014. 
34 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo, Judgment No. Ko97/12 (Pristina: Consti-
tutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo, 12 April 2013), http://gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/
KO97_12_AGJ_ANG.pdf. 
35 Author’s interviews with representatives of NGO Lens, Kosovo Law Institute and GAP 
Institute, Pristina, October and November 2013. 
36 Ibid.
37 Union of the Independent Trade Unions, BSPK, oﬃcial website, http://www.bspk.org/ 
38 Besiana Xharra, “Krimet e Bechtelit me punetore” [Bechtel’s crimes against workers], Zeri, 
28 October 2013, http://zeri.info/artikulli/18987/krimet-e-bechtel-it-me-punetore-foto-
dokument. 
39 “Kosoves I shtohen edhe tri universitete publike” [Kosovo gets three additional public uni-
versities], Telegraﬁ.com, 6 March 2013, http://www.telegraﬁ.com/lajme/kosoves-i-shtohen-
edhe-tri-universitete-publike-2-29767.html. 
 Nations in Transit 2014312
40 European Commission, Kosovo 2013 Progress Report. 
41 Independent Media Commission,  Annual report for the year 2012 (Pristina: Independent Media 
Commission, March 2013), http://kpm-ks.org/materiale/dokument/1369054659.2327.pdf. 
42 Shkamb Qavdarbasha, State of Media in Kosovo 2013, Institute for Development Policy 
(INDEP), p. 14, 16, 17. 
43 Kosovo Association of Information and Communication Technology (STIKK), Internet 
Penetration and Usage in Kosovo (Pristina: STIKK, January 2012), http://www.stikk-ks.org/
uploads/downloads/Internet_penetration_and_usage_in_Kosovo.pdf. 
44 Edona Peci, “Kosovo Media Struggle Against Interference,” Balkan Insight, 19 June 2013, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-media-struggle-against-interference. 
45 European Union Election Observation Mission, Kosovo Municipal Elections 3 November 
2013, Preliminary Statement: A Positive Step Forward for Democracy in Kosovo, http://www.
eueom.eu/ﬁles/pressreleases/english/preliminary-statement-in-kosovo-05112013_en.pdf. 
46 European Commission, Kosovo 2013 Progress Report.
47 “Deshton zgjedhja e anetareve te rinj te KPM-se” [The election of new members of IMC fails], 
Kosova Sot, 4 April 2013, http://www.kosova-sot.info/politike/kosove/deshton-zgjedhja-e-
anetareve-te-rinj-te-kpmse. 
48 “Shkarkohen dy anetaret e KPM-se” [Two members of the IMC are dismissed], Telegraﬁ, 
26 December 2013, http://www.telegraﬁ.com/lajme/shkarkohen-dy-anetaret-e-kpm-se-2-
39504.html. 
49 “Kot e ka IPKO, genjeshtra me nuk mund ta mposhte te verteten” [IPKO is empty 
handed, lies can no longer defeat the truth], Koha, 6 April 2013, http://www.koha.net/?
page=1,13,141465. 
50 “IPKO: Jemi nen presionin e grupit Koha” [IPKO: we are under pressure from Koha Group] 
Gazeta Express, 5 April 2013, http://www.gazetaexpress.com/index.php/artikujt/rubrika/
C21/C6/?cid=1,14,108074. 
51 “Komuna e Prishtines injoron kerkesat per qasje ne dokumente publike” [The municipality 
of Pristina ignores the requests for access to public documents], Koha.info, 11 November 
2013, http://www.koha.net/?page=1,31,165239. 
52 European Commission, Kosovo 2013 Progress Report.
53 “Krize ne AGPK, Dorehiqet Xhemajl Rexha I KTV-se” [A crisis within APJK, Xhemajl 
Rexha of KTV resigns], Tribuna Daily Newspaper, 5 May 2013, http://www.gazeta
tribuna.com/?FaqeID=7&LajmID=7103. 
54 Ministry of Local Government Administration of the Republic of Kosovo, Report on 
Performance of Municipalities 2013, http://mapl.rks-gov.net/Raporte/2013.aspx. 
55 Institute for Advanced Studies (GAP), The establishment of new municipalities in Kosovo 
(Pristina: Gap Institute, July 2013), http://www.institutigap.org/documents/2868_Theme
limi%20i%20Komunave%20t%C3%AB%20reja%20-%20ENG%20-%20ﬁnal.pdf. 
56 GAP, Population Census Data and their Impact on Public Policies (Pristina: GAP, 2012),http://
www.institutigap.org/repository/docs/ASK.pdf.
57 The Oﬃce of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo, Reports from the Government 
meetings, http://kryeministri-ks.net/?page=1,9,3658.
58 Gap, The establishment of new municipalities in Kosovo.
59 The new Criminal Code can be accessed at the oﬃcial website of the Kosovo Assembly at 
http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/?cid=2,191&ﬁlter=18.
60 Kosovo Judicial Council, “Kosovo Court Structure,” http://www.kgjk-ks.org/repository/
docs/KOSOVO-COURT-STRUCTURE_547880.pdf. 
61 Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, Law on Kosovo Budget 2013, http://www.assembly-
kosova.org/?cid=2,191&ﬁlter=1. 
  Kosovo 313
62 European Commission, Kosovo 2013 Progress Report.
63 Ibid. 
64 Edona Peci, “Kosovo Parliament Rejects ‘Family Revenge’ Murders Probe,” Balkan Insight, 
19 March 2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-parliament-to-probe-
kiqina-case. 
65 Ibid.
66 Author’s interview with Betim Musliu, researcher at Kosovo Law Institute and author of TV 
show “Betimi per Drejtesi,” Pristina, November 2013.
67 Author’s interview with Vehbi Kajtazi, investigative report at Koha Ditore, Pristina, 
November 2013.
68 Kosovo Law Institute, Press Release of 3 September 2013, http://kli-ks.org/index.php. 
69 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo, Judgment No KI/78/12, 24 January 2013, 
http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/gjkk_ki_78_12_v_ang.pdf. 
70 European Commission, Kosovo 2013 Progress Report, p. 10.
71 Bureau of Economic and Business Aﬀairs, “2013 Investment Climate Statement—Kosovo,” 
US Department of State, April 2013, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204671.
htm. 
72 FOL Movement Kosovo, “2013 in Kosovo: A year of high corruption and low eﬃciency in 
ﬁghting it,” http://www.uncaccoalition.org/fr/learn-more/articles/328-2013-in-kosovo. 
73 European Commission, Kosovo 2013 Progress Report.
74 “Krasniqi: Korrupsioni I shtrire horizontalisht dhe vertikalisht” [Krasniqi: Corruption 
is widespread, horizontally and vertically], Indeks Online, 24 January 2013, http://www.
indeksonline.net/?FaqeID=2&LajmID=45291. 
75 European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX Kosovo), “Five years imprisonment against 
Mustaﬁ for corruption,” press release, 23 May 2013, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/
pressreleases/0444.php. 
76 Author’s calculation based on press releases and interim reports issued by EULEX and the 
Kosovo Police.
77 “Financuesit e PDK-se, milionere” [PDK sponsors, millionaires], Zeri, 27 February 2012, 
http://www.zeri.info/artikulli/1/2/19900/ﬁnancuesit-e-pdk-se-milionere/.
78 Telegraﬁ, “Kritikohet Ligji per Financimin e Partive Politike” [The law on ﬁnancing political 
parties is criticised], Telegraﬁ News Agency, 22 July 2013, http://www.telegraﬁ.com/lajme/
kritikohet-ligji-per-ﬁnancimin-e-partive-politike-2-34352.html. 

